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Abstract
This article addresses land recovery and access to new land
for returning Guatemalan refugees as a way of exploring
the nuances and complexities of a repatriation operation
often judged a best-case scenario. It argues that the returnees
who fared best in obtaining land did so because of their
visible organization and ties to international organizations
that intervened on their behalf. The positive examples of
land access notwithstanding, a number of unresolved
problems regarding land use and titling remain. Further-
more, land in itself is insufficient for social and economic
reintegration if the larger context of sustainable and regional
development is not addressed.
Résumé
Cet article examine les questions de récupération de terres
et d’accessibilité aux terres nouvelles pour les réfugiés
guatémaltèques retournant au pays. En fait, cet examen
n’est qu’un prétexte pour explorer les nuances et les
complexités d’une opération de rapatriement souvent
donnée en exemple. L’article soutient que les « retournants »
qui ont le mieux réussi à obtenir des terres doivent leur
succès à leur organisation très visible et aux liens qu’ils
avaient avec des organismes internationaux qui sont
intervenus en leur faveur. Nonobstant les exemples positifs
d’accessibilité aux terres, un certain nombre de questions
restent en suspens, notamment celles touchant à l’exploitation
des terres et aux titres de propriété. En outre, la terre en
elle-même ne suffit pas pour assurer la réintégration sociale
et économique si le contexte plus vaste du développement
durable de la région n’est pas abordé.
Between 1981 and 1984, the unhcr recognized morethan 45,000 rural Guatemalans as refugees in south-ern Mexico.2 Most arrived in 1982 and 1983, fleeing
the worst of the counter-insurgency war that the Guate-
malan Army had been waging against a revolutionary guer-
rilla movement since the 1960s. Successive military
governments first used selective and then wide-scale re-
pression, which was aimed at not only guerrilla collabora-
tors, but anyone considered a sympathizer or potential
sympathizer. Thus whole villages were victims of indis-
criminate massacres. Survivors fled and neighbours picked
up and ran when they knew the army was en route. Refu-
gees were indigenous small-scale farmers (campesinos), rep-
resenting about eight language groups, from isolated border
regions, and most ended up in Chiapas, in southern Mexico.
Families subjected to the same terror further inland nor-
mally did not make it to the border but joined the ranks of
the internally displaced, whose numbers peaked at an esti-
mated 1.5 million in 1982 (some 20 per cent of Guatemala’s
population at the time).3 The Guatemalan Army used mass
displacement of the civilian population, immediately fol-
lowed by controlled resettlement, as a military strategy to
gain the upper hand on the guerrillas’ real or potential so-
cial base (avancso 1990; ceh 1999).
Those displaced persons not “recovered” and resettled
by the army in the short term were frequently branded as
guerrilla sympathizers. The army included the refugees
within this category, and in many cases refugee lands, both
private and state-controlled, were given out to new settlers
in the early 1980s. From this point on, Guatemalan refu-
gees in Mexico would point to the “land question” as a prin-
cipal one in determining if and when they would go home.4
When successive military regimes gave way to a civilian
and elected president in 1986, the new government sent del-
egations to woo the refugees home, promising, among other
things, that they could resettle their land. In part this was to
demonstrate to an international audience that Guatemala’s
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human rights problems were over. But many refugees knew
at the time that their lands were occupied or in conflict
zones and mistrusted government promises. In 1987 a group
of male political activists began to organize as many refu-
gees as possible to demand a “collective and organized re-
turn,” with land issues at the top of the agenda:
The struggle for land is one of the most important aspects in
the process of the collective and organized return. Our lands
in Guatemala were obtained with much sacrifice and legally
they are ours but we had to leave them due to army repres-
sion . . . We know that the government is giving out our lands
to other campesinos. (Comisiones Permanentes 1988)
After many setbacks and several years of negotiations,
the Guatemalan government and refugee representatives
signed an agreement known as the October 1992 Accords.
The October Accords state that the Guatemalan govern-
ment will guarantee basic security and living conditions,
and they allow for international institutions to act as wit-
nesses and guarantors. Since the Guatemalan peace proc-
ess was far from nearing conclusion at that point, the
refugees advocated returning in collective groups in order
to maximize their security and attract maximum (mostly
international) aid. The international donor community
supported the novel situation of refugees participating so
directly in establishing the terms of their repatriation.
Within Guatemala, these October Accords contributed by
example and in content to the broader peace process, which
culminated with guerrilla-government agreements in De-
cember 1996. From the point of view of the Guatemalan
refugees, the October 1992 Accords were especially impor-
tant because they directly addressed the issues of land ac-
cess and recovery.
The Lands Left Behind
Previous to their flight, a majority of the refugees came
from the large province of Huehuetenango bordered on
the west and north by Mexico. They were mostly from high-
land Indian communities settled for centuries, and from
lowland regions on the Mexican border. In general, their
land tracts were small, often too small to support a family,
and younger couples frequently had no land to claim at all.
Labour migration and commerce helped these families
supplement their livelihood. Some families had usufruct
of municipal lands controlled through the local municipal
authorities. Other families had individual private holdings
backed by documentation more valid between neighbours
than in a court of law, or land titles never inscribed in the
property registry. Still others had land in collectively held
private tracts with titles in the name of founding commu-
nity members from a century ago. In these cases, custom-
ary law would dictate how land was used by, and divided
among, the current generation.
At least a third of refugees came from newly settled ar-
eas on the agricultural frontier that had been populated
under state and Church colonization schemes from the
1960s on (ceh 1999). Refugee families from these coloniza-
tion areas left behind large tracts in the subtropical low-
lands. Land holdings in these cases were either on national
lands under government jurisdiction or on lands bought
and privatized by the Catholic Church with a land title in
the name of a community cooperative. In the second case,
“ownership” was derived from being a cooperative associ-
ate, of which there was one per family (always a male head-
of-household if one was present). In the case of national
lands, plots were allocated to individuals (mostly men) on
behalf of their families. Not all families managed to be prop-
erly registered with the government land institute, how-
ever, and even where the government had distributed
“provisional titles,” these did not constitute ownership of
national land. Incomplete national land registry records
and ambiguity in the law about provisional titles became
critical issues when refugees sought to recover these lands.
Though refugees could often make only tenuous legal
claims to the land they once occupied, their emotional
claims were powerful. Stories abound of elderly men and
women who stayed behind to die on their land rather than
leave it, and of refugee families who would sneak back to
check on their lands and even harvest abandoned crops.
Most refugees conceived of their flight into Mexico as a
desperate and temporary measure. They could not envi-
sion a refuge lasting more than a few weeks or months.
Only hindsight permitted the refugees to realize that leav-
ing had put their lands in jeopardy.
The Struggle for Land Recovery, Mediation
Strategies, and Local Conflict
Though refugees had left their land reluctantly and felt tied
to it spiritually, few landholdings remained unoccupied in
their absence. Land left by refugees was occupied by a com-
bination of government-induced and spontaneous popu-
lation movements. The motives of the occupying farmers
covered a broad spectrum. There are cases in which family
members or neighbours of the refugee family took care of
the land in their absence with the full intention of return-
ing it as soon as the rightful owner returned. In other cases,
a powerful member of the community, often someone de-
riving power and protection through links to the army,
usurped an individual plot. These two examples were more
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common in communities where some families were dis-
placed and others stayed behind. In villages where the en-
tire population was displaced, the government land institute
actively campaigned for landless campesinos to occupy “va-
cant” lands or looked the other way when such families
arrived on their own. A review of case studies of occupied
refugee lands for the Guatemalan Historical Clarification,
or “Truth,” Commission, mentioned more than a dozen
cases of occupation of national lands and specified six cases
of fomented occupation of collectively held private lands.5
Refugee attempts to recover occupied lands occurred in
two distinct periods. Small groups of repatriates that pio-
neered the land-recovery attempts beginning in 1987 (but
prior to the onset of the collective return process in 1993)
eventually gained access to their former communities, but
alongside the newcomer families who continued to occupy
other refugee-claimed lands. In these cases, the government
negotiated the return of a small number of families but in
a way that undermined the chances of additional refugee
families to do the same. In different cases, for example, the
occupying group was promised improved tenure security
in exchange for ceding vacant lands to repatriates benefit-
ing the latter in the short term but setting the stage for
conflicts when other groups of refugees attempted to re-
turn later.6
The negotiations initiated from 1993 on by the refugees
advocating collective and organized returns resulted in
some of the most confrontational incidents of the entire
repatriation process. By this time, those occupying refugee
lands had lived there for ten years or more and were loath
to give them up. Examining seventeen cases where refu-
gees were active in trying to recover national lands, basi-
cally four different outcomes occurred:7
1. The majority of the group received their former lands,
and the new occupants were compensated with alterna-
tive lands and/or money or divided the lands under dis-
pute (five cases).8
2. The new occupants remained on refugee lands, and the
refugees received other lands at no cost, although only
after years of negotiation (six cases).9
3. Refugees received neither their original lands nor alter-
native lands as a collective group. Some remained in
Mexico, and others individually signed up for new lands
as landless refugees (four cases).
4. Part of the land was never occupied and therefore easily
recovered, but an additional, occupied portion of land
claimed by the group was not recovered. The commu-
nity therefore had to make do with less overall exten-
sion than farmed previous to the violence (two cases).
The text of the October Accords was not always helpful
in aiding recovery of national land: the accords committed
the government to aid refugees with land recovery within
a stipulated time period but did not qualify or quantify the
type or extent of efforts to be made. Therefore it is impor-
tant to analyze why some groups obtained a satisfactory
solution (land recovery or alternative lands provided at no
cost) and others were completely unsuccessful. As a rule,
groups that were less dispersed during wartime displace-
ment and more united as a community were able to lobby
and mediate on their own behalf. They mostly appealed to
the Mediation Group created by the October 1992 Accords.
Or they appealed directly to the unhcr and/or otherwise
brought their cause to their international and Guatemalan
public. The Mediation Group paired respected Guatema-
lan institutions (the Catholic Bishops Conference and the
Human Rights Ombudsman’s office) with the unhcr and
a Mexican-based Guatemalan human rights organization.
A complementary international support group (known by
the acronym gricar) was made up of four embassy repre-
sentatives (Canada, France, Mexico, and Sweden) and two
international private organizations. These organizations
acted as witnesses to mediation efforts and therefore
brought pressure by the international donor community
to bear on the Guatemalan government to respond fairly
and promptly to refugee demands. The refugees were not
beyond using pressure tactics (medidas de hecho) to drama-
tize their cause and to force government action. These in-
cluded sit-ins at government offices as well as marches from
refugee camps towards the border or merely the threat to
do so. While some such activities backfired as the Guate-
malan government reacted punitively, others prompted
more timely solutions.
The active intervention of the Mediation Group and/or
ongoing direct pressure from the unhcr closely correlates
with positive outcomes for refugee groups in relation to
land recovery and/or alternative solutions.10 Satisfactory
results were more likely where this kind of intervention
occurred, regardless of the kind of land claim held. Con-
versely, not all cases with stronger legal claims resulted in
land recovery or compensation, unless significant pressure
was generated. In any case, when the disputes were between
two groups of campesinos for the same piece of land, just so-
lutions were contingent on the existence of sufficient resources
for both groups to receive some kind of compensation.
State Land Purchase Programs for Refugees
As roads penetrated remote regions, unoccupied national
lands in Guatemala became few and far between. As the
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last remaining tracts of national land were being set aside
as ecological reserves in the 1980s and 1990s, demographic
pressures and political movements in rural areas prompted
the government to create new land programs no longer
based on national land grants. Because land reform pro-
grams were anathema to Guatemala’s land-holding elite,
these new programs were based on government acquisi-
tion of private lands bought at market prices. The idea was
that poor beneficiary families would repay the purchase
price to the government over several years.
In 1992, in the agreement signed with refugees, the gov-
ernment promised that all adult refugees without land
could become landowners and that the “credit” extended
for its purchase would be repaid to a community develop-
ment fund, not to the government. The refugees were jubi-
lant over this solution, and some viewed it as historical
retribution for lands systematically stolen from Indian com-
munities since the Spanish conquest. Outsiders, even those
sympathetic to the refugee cause, wondered at the govern-
ment’s apparent demagoguery in promising generous terms
that at best would not be replicable to any group in Guate-
mala other than the refugees and at worst would simply be
unworkable because of the resources they would require.
By the time the last organized group of refugees had re-
turned to lands purchased by the Guatemalan government,
the latter estimated that $29.7 million had been spent on
land for returnees (ctear 1999).
Primarily two state programs were used to purchase
lands for refugees. One program, known as forelap, was
exclusively for returning refugees and offered the “revolv-
ing credit” scheme already described in which funds were
not reimbursed to the government. The other, fonatierra,
was based on much less favourable terms, and was open to
other rural families demonstrating sufficient need. The
national land institute, known as inta, which allocated
available national lands at subsidized prices, benefited one
group of returnees but thereafter argued that unoccupied
national lands no longer existed. The government had
phased out all three programs by early 1999 when legisla-
tion took effect, creating a new land fund mandated by the
1996 peace agreements.11
The land-acquisition programs for Guatemalan refugees
were complex and evolved continually. Since in essence
these programs were substitutes for other kinds of govern-
ment-initiated land-reform measures, it is of special inter-
est to examine the problems encountered:
• Much land was purchased at inflated prices. Given the
many irregularities of the Guatemalan land market, and
the prevalence of informal and therefore undocumented
land sales (undp 1999), it is difficult to determine how
much money was overspent. Nevertheless, the political
(and international) pressure on the government gener-
ated by the refugees permitted landowners to name their
price.12
• Because of the high costs involved, the government had
a financial incentive to direct refugees towards less pro-
ductive lands and to crowd more people together in or-
der to achieve a better ratio of cost per family.
• Some refugees were able to obtain expensive, more pro-
ductive lands, and others settled for less costly (and there-
fore more isolated and less productive) lands. This
resulted in great disparities between communities.
• For lands bought with credit due to the government over
the next ten years (through the now-defunct program
fonatierra), the payment schedules were not feasible,
based on projected production. For lands bought
through forelap, the program provided no mechanisms
for the returnees to channel land payments into a com-
munity-development fund as mandated. When some
communities expressed interest in creating such funds,
no technical support was offered.
• Given the high investment made by the government on
land purchase itself, the government has been unwilling
to give additional funds for production-oriented cred-
its or projects.
• There are few administrative mechanisms in governmen-
tal agencies to easily or automatically incorporate mar-
ried women as joint owners of lands purchased.
Government oversight continued, even in the face of
women’s mobilization to reclaim this right, and was
mainly due to the inability of government officials to
conceive of a man and a woman as joint heads of the
same family.
Despite these limitations, about 30 per cent of the nearly
23,000 refugees arriving as part of the self-defined collec-
tive return movement returned to their own lands, and the
rest solicited new lands under the purchase programs (or
received lands in compensation), sometimes together with
non-refugee families.13
Given that the land fund (known as fontierras) cre-
ated by the 1996 Peace Agreements mimics many aspects
of the previous land-purchase programs for refugees, a
closer examination of the latter could have yielded many
important lessons, both positive and negative, for the new
project. As it happened, those administrating the forelap
project were never consulted, nor were they asked for ad-
vice when the new Land Fund was being designed.14 If the
weakest points of the former land programs were an under-
funded budget, high land prices, and unrealistic repayment
plans, the new Land Fund is maintaining the status quo.
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Early in 2000 the fund was anticipating a serious shortfall
against funds committed, and even if the funding goal is
met, it will address perhaps 5 per cent of rural families de-
manding land (minugua 2000) if only five hectares per
family are given at current prices. As for repayment, even a
per family subsidy, flexible grace period, and slightly below-
market interest rate will not guarantee payment possibili-
ties if crop prices are less than optimum or any other
complication arises. A review of fontierras land purchases
in the last three years reveals a tendency for more inexpen-
sive farms to be purchased, as opposed to farms with good
access or quality farmland. One probable reason is the con-
cern of beneficiary groups (and the lending institutions
involved) about high indebtedness.
Land Titling Practices, Community Organization,
and Women’s Land Access
With notable exceptions, the vast majority of returnee com-
munities are not vulnerable to losing those lands from lack
of legal ownership.15 This is to say that their land tenure is
stable against threats from outside the community, and
most hold legally registered titles showing property either
in the name of several individuals or of a community-level
organization such as a cooperative or an association.
Even where ownership is assured, however, there are
problems. Not all lands were purchased with the precise
boundaries demarcated and/or with registered boundaries
that coincide with the on-ground perception (by the former
owner or by neighbours) of where the property lines are.
Thus communities often cannot have access to all of their
lands for cultivation or do not even know what areas can
be included in their land-use planning. Such boundary
problems have sometimes led to violent conflicts between
returnees and their neighbours and have led to prolonged
and costly court cases. And on some returnee lands, other
campesinos have undertaken land takeovers or incursions.
Where group land tenure is assured, one growing ten-
dency is to parcel out and privatize family-sized plots. Many
returnees express the opinion that holding individual pri-
vate titles would give them more independence and free-
dom. Practical obstacles for the returnees to put this into
practice are the exorbitant cost of land measurement and
legalization. Some negative consequences include the com-
plexity of splitting up collectively managed areas (rubber
tree plantations, for example) and the increasing ease with
which individuals within the community would be able to
sell their land. The latter is considered problematic, despite
the flexibility it offers, given that other individuals, per-
haps from outside the community, could accumulate dis-
proportionate amounts of land, and also that high turnover
or speculation is likely to result in ecological degradation.
But there is another kind of problem pitting collective
land security against individuals and the rights of individual
families to live and farm in the community. Where lands
were allocated collectively through cooperatives or asso-
ciations (registered entities legally apt to own land), it is
relatively easy for a majority of voting members to expel
other members from the organization and deny that per-
son and his or her family any rights in the community. Sev-
eral members have been expelled in this way, sometimes
by community consensus, but often through manipulation
by a few leaders.16
The land rights of women, especially women with part-
ners (married or common-law) are not upheld in the ma-
jority of returnee communities where the community
enjoys clear title. Whereas there is practice and custom as-
sociated with letting a widowed woman or single mother
with dependants represent her family on a land title or in a
land-owning cooperative, the movement for all adult com-
munity women to be joint property owners has met with
limited success. As previously mentioned, government in-
stitutions continually discriminated against women, even
when explicitly petitioned that women represent their fami-
lies side by side with their spouses. Aside from wanting the
status and power derived from being recorded as joint
owners, female refugees were concerned that women who
separate or are abandoned often lose access to household
lands or goods. The unhcr and several non-governmental
organizations supported the refugee women and their or-
ganizations in their quest to develop these ideas and lobby
the government institutions to uphold their rights. While
most refugee groups after 1996 began to include women in
the documents transacting land purchases, women encoun-
tered many problems back home when they tried to be-
come cooperative members (Morel 1998; Lozano 1997).
Where land ownership was subsequently transferred into
the name of the cooperative, women were newly excluded
because they were not members and also lost their poten-
tial role in many community affairs as more and more de-
cision making was passed to the cooperative and its
leadership.
Returnee men are more passive about—and sometimes
directly opposed to—women’s organizing in return com-
munities, as compared to a more supportive stance in
Mexico, where women’s mobilization helped make the refu-
gee struggle to return home visible and appealing to an
international audience. But there are also differences in how
the communities define productive work. For example, the
institutions that work with cooperatives reinforce the con-
cept that every single member must contribute with co-op
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dues and community labour in the same way. Men, there-
fore, put pressure on women to pull their own weight with
equal contributions of cash and physical labour in order to
be members. While such expectations are especially oner-
ous for widows and single mothers, this approach also
misses the heart of the matter articulated by female lead-
ers: women’s work (in the fields and with children and do-
mestic responsibilities in the home) subsidize the labour
and cash contributions credited to their husbands. Were
this work visible and valued, the community would recog-
nize that women are already paying membership dues and
have been doing so for some time. Despite the ongoing work
by returnee women’s organizations on the topic, the daily
struggle for economical survival seems to have derailed or
postponed most returnee women’s abilities to organize
around these rights, and outside advocates have given only
limited assistance. As a result, most land titles and/or co-
operatives in the returnee communities exclude women
with partners, and households headed by women alone are
subject to a disproportionate burden of work in order to
have land.17
Repatriation with Land: A Durable Solution
in Itself?
Given the apparent lack of restriction upon where return-
ing refugees could settle, it is surprising to observers that
some communities ended up on agricultural lands with
good potential and others in extremely remote areas with
lands of poor quality. This disparity is the result of two
factors. First, many refugees chose to return to their lands
and/or areas of origin as a result of cultural and family ties,
despite the limitations that these areas represented. Sec-
ond, from 1993 until 1998, state land-acquisition programs
explicitly limited refugees to seek new lands in more iso-
lated areas of the country and gave them strict price limi-
tations, which further limited their options. With few
exceptions, therefore, lands were not acquired in the more
accessible and land-rich Pacific coast and piedmont regions
until 1998–9, when the government changed its purchase
policy. Some of the more recently established communi-
ties, therefore, have better long-term potential (if capital
for productive activities is made available) but received less
short-term assistance from the unhcr and many other
funding initiatives that targeted returnees but were dis-
banded by this late return date.
Returnee villages vary in many ways that affect their de-
velopment potential (length of time established, degree of
external support, internal organization, land quality, pro-
duction, proximity to markets, access, and infrastructure).
The majority, however, are relying on a combination of
subsistence agricultural (corn and beans) and cash crops
(coffee, cardamom, rubber, sugar cane) and/or beef cattle
to launch them into the new millennium and out of pov-
erty. Except for a handful of communities close to major
roadways and already producing coffee, the immediate
prospects for returnee villages are bleak. Neither credit for
agricultural production nor technical support is readily
available, and there are no safeguards against market fluc-
tuation, environmental degradation, or natural disasters.
The emergency and resettlement programs by international
and Guatemalan development organizations, the unhcr,
and the government dwindled once most refugees had
crossed the border home, and the initial euphoria over the
culmination of the peace process was soon over. The ma-
jor peace and development initiatives, however, by the likes
of aid, the European Union, the World Bank, and the In-
ter-American Development Bank, are yet to generate vis-
ible results for returnee communities and their neighbours.
For repatriation scenarios during and after armed con-
flict, with similarities to those of Guatemala, some lessons
can be concluded. In recovering land or receiving due com-
pensation, it is critical that refugee groups be supported
and given the necessary legal assistance and technical ad-
vice. Ensuring adequate resources that guarantee compen-
sation and a positive solution for competing parties is
important, so that economic development is promoted and
tensions are diminished between population groups. In
land titling, a model that permits both women and men to
jointly represent the beneficiary family is one way of pro-
tecting women’s interests. Such a model is appropriate, es-
pecially when women are not recognized as farmers (as in
much of Latin America), even though they fully share farm
labour and generate the payments used for land purchase.
In any case, the trade-off between community and indi-
vidual rights is at issue in community-held joint titles, both
in gender equality and in the security of political or ethnic
minorities. Mechanisms that permit due process protect-
ing individual rights can therefore be important for com-
munity prosperity.
In promoting land acquisition programs to enable re-
patriation, the laudable efforts of the Guatemalan govern-
ment to purchase private lands for returnees are yet to be
tested as the soundest and most cost-efficient way to allo-
cate land to those who would farm it. While it does avoid
the politically sensitive problem of land redistribution
through other means, the model has resulted in the pur-
chase from large-scale landowners at high prices the lands
that they themselves no longer find lucrative. This is not
exactly the open land market benefiting buyers that its ad-
vocates would like to see.
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In summary, the Guatemalan returnees are probably bet-
ter off than many of their national rural counterparts, but
they still share the same overall limitations that the coun-
try has as a whole in relation to the international economy.
Despite having land, the returnees are still on the losing
side of the vast and growing inequality that continues to
characterize Guatemalan society. In an eminently agrarian
society, land is an important starting point for the Guate-
malan refugees, even when their livelihood has long been
supplemented with economic strategies that are not land-
based. By the same token, however, land itself, in the ab-
sence of supporting structures that make farming viable, is
only the beginning.
Endnotes
1. Initial ideas for this article were developed by the author in
unhcr (1998), undp (1999), and Worby (2000).
2. Many more Guatemalans arrived in Mexico but continued
north, returned quickly to Guatemala, or settled outside of ar-
eas that would become refugee camps. The figure of 45,000 is
taken from a unhcr internal report for 1984, also cited in ceh
(1999). While it includes the first children born in the camps
before 1984, it ignores others who stayed only briefly.
3. This frequently cited number for internally displaced has its
origins in estimations made by the Catholic Church. The esti-
mate is plausible, after a review of additional data such as a
1984 study of abandoned villages in conflict areas. For further
discussion, see ceh, chap. 4, vol. 4, 1999.
4. This paper will not go into a history or description of land prob-
lems in Guatemala, a topic amply documented elsewhere. It is
enough to say that inequality that results from land distribu-
tion is one cause of Guatemala’s long conflict. The demand for
land by the rural poor and disputes over specific lands remain
sources of ongoing tension and violence.
5. Details in ceh (1999), chap. 3, paragraphs 408–15, and annex 5
of the same chapter. Municipal lands and individual cases are
not described in detail in this article, although occupation of
both occurred. In general, those reclaiming municipal lands
were more successful the sooner they returned; most problems
occurred for those wishing to return by the mid-1990s, often in
large groups. Occupation of individual private holdings was
probably underreported to the unhcr and other relevant au-
thorities. Often families quietly negotiated their re-entry into
their village of origin with no outside aid or decided not to
pursue potentially difficult claims but rather signed up with
other “landless” refugees in the hope of obtaining new and su-
perior lands elsewhere. The last option allowed such families to
maintain the sense of community created in exile with other
refugees and in that sense was preferable to the isolation they
would have experienced as repatriates in their village of origin.
6. See Manz (1988), wola (1989), and avancso (1992) for ample
description of these cases and government policy towards re-
patriation at the time.
7. The seventeen cases represent sixteen communities (one with
two different outcomes) and are the total number of cases
known to the unhcr of communities with national lands where
at least a handful of families (fifteen or more) expressed inter-
est in returning. They are located in four municipalities: Nenton,
Huehuetenango; Ixcan, Quiche; La Libertad and Sayaxche,
Peten. The list excludes two other communities (in Nenton and
Ixcan, respectively) where national lands were recovered be-
cause no new occupants were present as a result of the conflictive
and isolated nature of the sites.
8. A similar positive solution occurred in five of the six cases pre-
viously mentioned where collectively held private lands were
occupied. Refugees had more leverage in these cases, given the
sanctity accorded to private lands by government politicians.
9. While it resolved the problem from a material standpoint be-
cause the same amount of land was granted, the solution ig-
nored emotional and other factors. For some communities, the
lost chance to go “home” meant that the fragmentation and
dispersion of its former members were indeed permanent.
10. In the seventeen cases of occupied national lands previously
cited, for example, there were eleven cases where the Mediation
Group, the unhcr on its own, or entities later set up with the
peace accords intervened with significant effort, and refugees
either regained their lands or received others in their stead. For
the six that were less successful, five received little or no sup-
port from the institutions mentioned.
11. Special credit conditions for refugees were maintained until the
last group of refugees petitioning for new lands returned in
March 1999. By this date, it was assumed that the vast majority
of the 22,000 Guatemalans still in Mexican camps (half of which
were born there) would choose to integrate into their country
of exile. In the future, any new group of refugees petitioning
for land will have to use the new fund created by the peace agree-
ments, open to any qualifying low-income Guatemalans, in
which beneficiaries are granted a per-family subsidy and below-
market interest rates but are obligated to repay lands purchased
at market prices. At current land prices, the subsidy is equal to
the cost of about half a hectare in the fertile coastal region or
up to eight hectares in isolated rainforest ill-suited for agricul-
ture (according to land prices reported by minugua 2000). This
compares to thirty to forty-five hectare plots given out to
colonizers by the government in the 1960s and 1970s in the then
isolated agricultural frontier.
12. This situation led to the ironic situation in which refugees ad-
vocated higher prices for the land-owning class they theoreti-
cally opposed. The land purchase program was also unable to
attract international aid given the (well-founded) perception
that the majority of funds benefited landowners who were al-
ready wealthy.
13. These figures are derived from unhcr data and familiarity with
the destination of each returnee group. In total, 43,600 refu-
gees repatriated with unhcr and government assistance be-
tween 1984 and June 1999, including a high proportion of
children born in refugee camps. Of those who did not arrive
with the collective return groups, the vast majority returned to
their lands of origin. Thus, calculated as a percentage of all re-
patriates, about 60 per cent went, at least initially, to their former
communities.
14. Interview by author of high-level forelap official in May 1997.
The preliminary fund designed by government staff in 1997 un-
derwent modification when Congress approved the legislation
formalizing the fund in May 1999. In the interim, a peace ac-
cord “parity” commission with campesino and Maya organiza-
tion representatives alongside the government representatives
had significant input into the draft law. No women were a part
of this process and neither were groups identified with displaced
or returned population.
15. The notable exceptions include three communities of returnees
whose lands were purchased under the fonatierra program
previously cited. The communities allege that their status as
returnees under the October 1992 agreements exempt them
from the strict repayment terms required by the program, and
that the government’s choice of fonatierra as a funding
mechanism was based on a fallacious argument that the pro-
gram providing credit not repayable to the government,
forelap, could not legally purchase lands in the land-rich Pa-
cific coast region. As of this writing, the lands in question are
now under the jurisdiction of a new government institution,
and a solution (partial payment and partial condoning of the
debt) is under negotiation.
16. Political and/or personal differences have been at the root of
most cases. While one group of returnees averted their disputed
expulsion that was related to political differences between them-
selves and community leaders in one 1997 publicized case, other
communities have quietly purged families with unpopular po-
litical views or those opposed to the cooperative or association
leadership.
17. A preliminary review of fifty communities (mostly collective
return sites and representing roughly 25,000 people) shows that
if (1) recent non-discriminatory legislation and administrative
rules affecting national lands are respected as titling occurs on
untitled lands, and (2) if women do not lose access in the sev-
eral communities where they have already gained co-ownership
through purchase agreements or co-op membership, then
women would have outright tenure security in perhaps seven-
teen. Losing ground is possible: in the last two years, female
owners were dispossessed through land transfer to coopera-
tives in at least six cases. The other communities do not include
women as owners, with the exception of (some) widows, al-
though some leaders affirm that the plan is to title women and
men together as the communities achieve their long-term goal
of legally dividing up their lands for each family.
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